Marcel Bubert: Das Tier, das denkt: Was ist der Mensch? Zur Funktion der anima intellectiva in den Grenzziehungen zwischen Mensch und Tier im Spätmittelalter
At first glance, there are good reasons to believe that medieval distinctions of humans and animals were based on epistemological premises which left little room for debate. From an Aristotelian point of view, for instance, the assumption of an “intellective soul” (anima intellectiva) of human beings established a clear demarcation-line which could hardly be challenged. However, the question of whether there was a static boundary between human and non-human beings in medieval thinking remains highly ambiguous. After a general introduction to the theoretical background and the contemporary debates on human-animal relations, this study intends to discuss to which degree the demarcation of human and animals was subject to conflicting interpretations. Which criteria were applied to establish a taxonomy of creatures and how far were they accepted or questioned? It will be argued that specific (social) contexts and conflicts in the later Middle Ages could in fact stimulate discussions which, to a certain degree at least, anticipated modern perspectives. As will be shown, the concept of the anima intellectiva plays a crucial role in these debates.
Keywords: Human-Animal-Studies – Epistemic Orders – Philosophy of Mind – Sociology of Knowledge – Learned Conflicts